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Despite public and private cost-containment initiatives enacted during the 1980s, U.S. health care expenditures continue to rise at rates significantly above the growth rate in the overall economy. In 1986, the United States spent 10.9 percent of its gross national product (GNP) on health care, compared with 10.6 percent in 1985 and 9.1 percent in 1980 (Exhibit 1). Spending on health care in the United States continues to exceed that of other developed countries (see accompanying DataWatch on international health spending).
In 1986, the United States spent $458 billion on health care (Exhibit 2). This represents an average annual expenditure of $1,837 per person and suggests that, between January 1 and February 10, the U.S. economy was working simply to pay its health care bill. Of the $458 billion spent on health care, $404 billion, or 88 percent, was spent on personal health services. The remaining 12 percent was spent on program administration ($24.5 billion), government public health ($13.4 billion), research ($8.2 billion), and construction ($8.0 billion). Health care expenditures increased 8.4 percent from 1985 to 1986. While this rate of increase is slightly lower than the rate of increase in most recent years, it is still much faster than the increase in overall inflation (1.1 percent), population (1.0 percent), or GNP (5.2 percent). After adjusting for overall inflation and population growth, expenditures for health care increased 6.3 percent during 1986, a rate substantially above the rate occurring in the period from 1980 to 1985 (Exhibit 3). This real growth in health spending, commonly known as service intensity, is what concerns most policymakers, since it indicates that providers are using more technology, personnel, and services per capita.
Expenditure Categories
During 1980-1986, spending for individual components of the health care market increased at very different rates (Exhibit 4). The slowestgrowing components were construction (3.5 percent per year) and biomedical research (7.5 percent per year). Expenditures for both program administration and other professional services increased at more than 14 percent per year. The hospital and physician sectors grew at annualized rates of 10.2 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively.
Despite differential rates of growth by service type, patterns of expenditures and sources of funds have remained relatively constant during the 1980s. Nearly 40 percent of health spending is for hospital services, and 20 percent is for physician services (Exhibit 5). In 1986 we spent $720 per person on hospital care, $370 on physician care, $53 on government public health activities, and $31 on biomedical research.
The private sector provided 59 percent of the health care funds, the federal government 29 percent, and state and local governments the remaining 12 percent. The distribution of sources of funds, however, varies widely by expenditure category (Exhibit 6). For example, out-ofpocket payments represent 10.6 percent of hospital revenues and 74.9 percent of the payments for drugs and sundries. Third-party payers may choose to pay only for certain services. Private insurers, for example, pay over 40 percent of physician fees but almost no nursing home bills.
Cost-containment Initiatives
During the 1980s, a series of public and private cost-containment initiatives was adopted. Data from the health expenditures survey and other sources can provide us with some preliminary indicators of how well these initiatives are working. Readers should recognize, however, that the data used in the national expenditure series are subject to revision as more data become available and that the analysis presented here does not attempt to control for many of the factors that might explain the rates of increase in health care spending. The Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) was enacted in 1983. From 1980 to 1983, Medicare expenditures for inpatient hospital care increased at an average annual rate of 16.5 percent in a period when overall inflation averaged 6.5 percent. From 1983 to 1986, Medicare expenditures for inpatient services increased at 8.2 percent per year, with inflation averaging 2.9 percent. Adjusting for the effect of changes in inflation, it appears that PPS reduced the real rate of increase in Medicare spending for inpatient hospital services by 4.3 percent (Exhibit 7). During 1983-1986, increases in Medicare spending for inpatient services were substantially higher than the increases in Medicare hospital pay- ment rates granted by Congress, suggesting the quantity and/ or scope of services provided to Medicare patients changed.
Overall spending on hospital services increased more rapidly in the 1980 to 1983 period (13.1 percent) compared to the 1983 to 1986 period (7.0 percent). After adjusting for inflation, overall hospital spending was still lower in the later period (6.1 versus 3.9 percent). These results suggest that, although many anticipated that cost shifting would intensify following Medicare's implementation of PPS, this does not appear to have occurred. It is interesting to note that hospital spending in the Medicare program increased more rapidly than overall hospital spending, following the adoption of PPS.
From July 1984 to May 1986, Medicare froze physician fees for participating physicians; the freeze ended December 31, 1986 for nonparticipating physicians. However, during the period from 1983 to 1986, physician expenditures in Medicare increased (adjusted for inflation) at an average annual rate of 9.1 percent (Exhibit 8). This is higher than the 7.2 percent annualized increase for all physician expenditures. This suggests that physicians may be increasing the volume of procedures and visits provided to Medicare patients to make up for lost revenues. During 1986, expenditures for physician services in the Medicare program increased at exactly the same rate (11.1 percent) as overall physician expenditures, ten times faster than the overall inflation rate.
In 1981, states were given more flexibility to design their own health care programs. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), for example, allowed states to design hospital payment methods for their Medicaid programs and to alter their Medicaid coverage and benefit policies. By 1983, many states had taken advantage of this opportunity. Increases in state and local spending for hospital services were substantially below the rate of increase in overall hospital spending in both Private insurers have adopted a variety of cost-containment strategies. During 1983 During -1986 , their efforts to contain costs appear to have been the most successful with respect to hospital costs (Exhibit 10). Success at controlling hospital costs, however, may result in higher inflation in other components of health care. The increased administrative cost of monitoring the various initiatives is apparent, as are the costs of treating patients outside of the hospital. 1980 -1983 And 1983 -1986 Implications These data suggest that the overall rate of increase in health care spending has not been slowed significantly by recent cost-containment initiatives. The inability of these policies to slow health expenditure increases may be interpreted four ways. First, it may be that, as a society, we prefer the continual increases in health care spending. These increases are not necessarily inevitable; many industrialized nations that experienced similar health care expenditure increases in the past were able to bring their rates of increase and overall spending to levels below those of the U.S. (see following DataWatch). Nevertheless, it may be our "revealed preference" as a nation to spend a high proportion of our wealth on health care services.
The failure of cost-containment initiatives also may indicate that recent policies have been misdirected. Over the last twenty years, economists have offered a variety of theories as to why health care costs increase so rapidly, and have designed specific public and private costcontainment programs in response. A second reason for the apparent failure of cost containment may be that current theories regarding rising health care costs are flawed. For example, PPS was created to alter the incentives inherent in open-ended, cost-based reimbursement, which were said to be a major cause of rapid health care cost increases. However, if cost-based reimbursement is not to blame for rising health care costs, then PPS will not be effective in controlling costs.
A third possibility is that we have identified correctly the theoretical reasons for rising costs but have constructed inappropriate policy re- sponses. Using PPS as an example, although cost-based reimbursement may indeed be responsible for rising hospital costs, prospective payment may not be the appropriate mechanism for controlling costs; it creates an incentive to increase admissions, unbundle services, and discharge patients early.
A fourth alternative is that we have identified correctly the reasons for rising health care costs and have created appropriate policies, but program implementations have been flawed. Again, using PPS as an example, it may be that prospective payment is an appropriate mechanism for controlling rising costs, but the PPS payment rates were originally set too high.
It is essential that we continue monitoring trends in health care spending. If we devote an increasing proportion of our resources to health care, we must consider which of these explanations for the apparent failure of cost-containment policies is correct.
